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Abstract
When labour unions are able to use first-best price discrimination,
they can extract a wage above the marginal product of labour. In other
words, employment is above the firm’s own optimum – this is feath-
erbedding or overmanning. This effect can capture the importance
that unions put on maximizing employment. While labour market
reforms are usually beneficial in the long run, they can be detrimental
in the short run if investment does not pick up quickly enough.
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1 Introduction
Labour market reforms in Europe have long been debated, but the topic has
gained large prominence since the 2008 Crisis. Despite a consensus on the
long term gains of such policies, there is strong disagreement on their short
run impact, and their soundness during downturns.
Many DSGE macro models with labour market rigidities use the reduced
form interpretation that these rigidities increase the wage markup. This is
the analog of monopolistic competition in the goods market: a producer has
monopoly power over his own variety, and charges a uniform price in an
anonymous market. Since consumers choose quantities freely, the demand
curve is unaffected, while the price markup shifts the supply curve inwards.
Transposed to the labour market, the labour supply curve is shifted in-
wards by a wage markup, while the demand curve is unaffected. It is sensible
to assume linear pricing in many goods market: firms cannot observe indi-
vidual consumers to conduct first-best price discrimination. However, this
assumption can be less sensible for the labour market. Labour isn’t hired by
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anonymous firms. Workers or unions have more information about the com-
pany in which they work, hence I argue that first-best price discrimination –
or featherbedding can be a more adequate model in some labour markets.
A worker is able to extract all the surplus that he generates, and not
just his marginal product. The wage is equal to the average product of
labour, above the marginal product. This shifts the labour demand curve
out, and leads to over-employment. Featherbedding has two opposite effects
on the labour market. Setting the wage above the worker’s marginal rate of
substitution lowers employment. But having the wage above the marginal
product of labour increases employment. The two effects can cancel each
other or not. It provides a more realistic model of unions: they try to
maximize wages, but not necessarily at the cost of employment. The effect of
reforms on employment depends on which curve shifts most. In a depression,
increasing featherbedding forces firms to hire more in the short run: this is
a possible justification of some of the New Deal anticompetitive policies.
Related literature
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), the literature on structural reforms
has studied the best strategies to implement these policies. Krause and
Uhlig (2012) analyse the German Hartz reforms in a DSGE macro model.
Using a calibrated multi-country DSGE model, Bayoumi et al. (2004) as
well as Everaert and Schule (2006) look at the spillovers of such reforms
and emphasize the importance of coordinating reforms across the Eurozone.
More recently, Cacciatore et al. (2016) find that the timing of product and
labour market reforms relative to the business cycle greatly matters in the
short-run. Eggertsson et al. (2014) caution against deflationary structural
reforms at the zero lower bound in a New Keynesian DSGE model.
This paper is also related to the labour economics literature on collective
bargaining. The model of a union as a monopolist wage setter – the firm
being free to choose employment – dates back to Dunlop (1944), and was
generalised by Nickell and Andrews (1983) as the right-to-manage model. In
contrast, McDonald and Solow (1981) and Manning (1987) developed models
where unions bargain over both wages and employment. If the union is able to
enforce a level of employment above the firm’s own labour demand, this leads
to over-employment, also referred to as featherbedding. This can however be
efficient by offsetting the negative employment effect of the wage markup.
Finally, this paper has links with the literature on the degree of centralisation
of collective bargaining (see Calmfors and Drifill 1988, or Layard et al. 1991).
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2 The model
This paper will compare the right-to-manage and featherbedding models. In
the first the union sets a wage, subject to a labour demand curve. In the
second, the union sets both the wage and the level of employment.
2.1 Featherbedding: labour demand
I model the wage bargaining between a worker and a firm as a principal-
agent problem. There are N workers (or worker types), indexed by i. The
representative firm has a production function F (L). The aggregate labour
supply L is an aggregate of the labour supplied by each worker i, defined by:
g(L) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
g(Li)
Both F (·) and g(·) are increasing, concave function with F (0) = g(0) = 0.
Concavity of production requires that F (g−1(·)) is also concave – a stronger
condition.1 If the firm observes a wage Wi and is free to choose the amount
of labour Li, it equalizes the marginal surplus MS(Li) with the wage.
MS(Li) =
∂F
∂Li
=
1
N
g′(Li)
g′(L)
F ′(L) =
1
N
g′(Li)
g′(L)
MPL (1)
On the other hand, if the worker/union of type i is able to choose the wage
and employment together, there is a participation constraint: the firm must
be better off accepting Wi and Li than not employing type i at all. Denote
F (Li, Lk 6=i) = F (L1, ., Li, ., LN) = F
[
g−1
(
1
N
∑N
k=1 g(Lk)
)]
and similarly
F (0, Lk 6=i) = F
[
g−1
(
1
N
∑
k 6=i g(Lk)
)]
. The participation constraint is
TS(Li) = F (Li, Lk 6=i)− F (0, Lk 6=i) ≥ WiLi
When N is large, the binding participation constraint can be approximated:
TS(Li) =
1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)
F ′(L) =
1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)
MPL = WiLi
Hence, the wage is the average surplus product of labour.
1For constant elasticities in the production function and labour aggregate, F (L) = L1−α
and L =
(
1
N
∑
N
i=1
L
ǫ−1
ǫ
i
) ǫ
ǫ−1
, these conditions imply 1/ǫ < α < 1
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Property 1 (1) Under perfect competition and linear pricing, the firm ob-
serves the wages (Wi) and chooses its labour demands (Li) to maximize its
profits. The marginal surplus product of worker i is equal to the wage.
Wi =MS(Li) =
1
N
g′(Li)
g′(L)
MPL
∂ lnWi
∂ lnLi
=
g′′(Li)Li
g′(Li)
(2) Under price discrimination, the worker of type i is able to capture all of
the total surplus that he generates for the firm, WiLi = TS(Li), or
Wi = AS(Li) =
1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)Li
MPL
∂ lnWi
∂ lnLi
=
g′(Li)Li
g(Li)
− 1
(3) From the concavity of g(·), g(Li)
g′(Li)Li
> 1 hence AS(Li) > MS(Li)
The demand elasticity, ǫ = − ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi
is equal under (1) and (2) if g(·) is CES.
Under the featherbedding case, the wage is higher for every level of employ-
ment. Or equivalently, the labor demand is higher for every level of wage.
2.2 Labour supply
The household of type i maximize the representative utility function2
maxE0
+∞∑
t=0
βt [u(N.Ct(i))− v(Lt(i))]
subject to a budget constraint Ct(i) +QtBt(i) = Bt−1(i) +Wt(i)Lt(i) +
Dt
N
The agent receives a dividend Dt from a diversified equity portfolio, and a
wage compensation Wt(i)Lt(i). New bonds Bt can be exchanged at price Qt.
Property 2 (1) Under perfect competition, the wage is equal to the marginal
rate of substitution, Wi =
MRSi
N
= 1
N
v′(Li)
u′(C)
(2) Under both linear pricing and price discrimination, the wage is a
markup over the MRS, with the elasticity ǫ = − ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi
defined in property (1)
Wi =
1
N
ǫ
ǫ− 1
MRSi =
1
N
ǫ
ǫ− 1
v′(Li)
u′(C)
2The factor N is simply introduced for scaling reasons as in the labour aggregate previ-
ously. With N symmetric agents, each consumes 1/N of the available total consumption,
Ct(i) = Ct/N but the MRS will feature the marginal utility of aggregate consumption
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Both the competitive and featherbedding cases have efficient employment,
since MPL and MRS are equal. With linear pricing, employment is ineffi-
ciently low.
I now assume a continuum of workers/unions, to get rid of the factor N :
Theorem 1 In the symmetric equilibrium
(1) Under perfect competition W =MPL =MRS
(2) Under linear pricing W =MPL = ǫ
ǫ−1
MRS with ǫ = − g
′(L)
g′′(L)L
(3) Under featherbedding MPL =MRS = ǫ−1
ǫ
W with ǫ = 1
1−
g′(L)L
g(L)
Labour market rigidities are usually modeled as an employment tax, as it
creates a wedge between demand and supply of labour. But here, these
rigidities are acting instead as a capital income tax: featherbedding creates
a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the returns to capital,
and can be thought of as a tax on profits:
D = Y −WL = F (L)−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
MPL.L < F (L)−MPL.L
2.3 Capital intensity
Let me now introduce capital. The production function is homogeneous in
capital and labour, Y = F (K,L) and capital accumulation writes
Kt+1 = Yt − Ct + (1− δ)Kt
δ is the rate of depreciation. Firm owners earn the residual profits:
RK = F (K,L)−WL
If workers are paid their MPL, capital will be paid its MPK since F is ho-
mogeneous. But if the wage is higher, the returns to capital will be lower.3
Lemma 1 (1) Under perfect competition and linear pricing, the firm chooses
labour (W =MPL), and the rate of return is the marginal product of capital.
R =
∂F
∂K
3It is important to note that wages are only bargained after capital has been installed,
so that it leads to a hold up problem of firms by unions. This problem could in theory
be avoided through ex-ante commitment (see Grout, 1984). But here, atomistic work-
ers/unions have an incentive to renege since their individual actions do not affect the
overall level of investments.
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(2) Under price discrimination, the wage is above the MPL, hence returns
are lower. There is wedge between the MPK and the returns to capital
R =
Y
K
−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
L
K
∂F
∂L
=
∂F
∂K
−
1
ǫ− 1
(
Y
K
−
∂F
∂K
)
In steady state, the interest rate, net of depreciation, is equal to the rate
of time preference: R = ρ + δ with ρ = 1/β − 1. Using lemmas 1–2 as well
as C = Y − δK in steady state, I can solve the equilibrium L, C and K.
Theorem 2 (proof in appendix) (1) Under linear pricing, L,C and K
are lower than under perfect competition, due to the markup
(2) Under featherbedding, C and K are lower than under perfect compe-
tition. The effect on employment L is ambiguous
(3) C and K are higher under linear pricing than under featherbedding.
The comparative impact on employment L is ambiguous
The intuition is as follows. With linear pricing, the MRS markup re-
duces labour supply and consumption. This reduced labour supply lowers
returns to capital hence capital itself, which further reduces labour supply
and consumption. Under featherbedding, the abnormally low returns to cap-
ital greatly reduce capital and hence output and consumption. For labour,
there is a negative substitution effect (low wages due to low capital) and a
positive income effect (due to the lower consumption). A high elasticity of
consumption in the utility function makes the income effect bigger. Hence,
when the consumption elasticity σ is very low, there is little or no income
effect, so that the substitution effect of lower capital and lower wages brings
the featherbedding employment below the competitive and linear pricing out-
come. For very high values of σ, the high income effect dominates and there
is more work than under the two alternatives. For intermediate values of
σ, people work more under featherbedding than linear pricing, but less than
under perfect competition.
2.4 Application: labour market reforms
This framework is useful to analyse structural labour market reforms. I as-
sume that the economy starts from a featherbedding situation, with a markup
both on the MPL and MRS side. The structural reform can lower either the
MPL markup alone, or both markups together. These two cases can be inter-
preted as two different kinds of reforms, that either preserve insider/outsider
dynamics, or are more inclusive. Allowing the MPL or both markups to
fall has immediate consequences on employment, but it also leads to higher
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investment driven by higher expected profits. Hence in the long run capi-
tal increases, which improves the efficiency of the economy. This improved
efficiency has two effects on employment: the higher capital increases the
real wage while increased consumption will lower the labour supply. For a
very high relative risk aversion, the income effect can be stronger then the
substitution effect.
As an illustration, I use an isoelastic production function Y = KαL1−α
and an isoelastic, separable utility function u(C) − v(L) = C
1−σ
1−σ
− λL
1+φ
1+φ
.4
Figure 1 shows the long run percentage change in employment caused by
a marginal reduction in one or two of the markups. Not surprisingly, an
inclusive reform is better at reducing unemployment. In fact, reducing only
the MPL markup will often lead to a fall in employment in the long run. This
fall in employment is not welfare deteriorating, especially since consumption
does increase in the long run hence households consume more and work
less. But this does illustrate that not all structural reforms are beneficial to
employment in the long run.
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(b) Both markups
Figure 1: Marginal (long term) percentage increase in labour with a reduction
in one or two of the markups, depending on the relative risk aversion σ
How these reforms affect employment in the short run depends on invest-
ment. The level of capital does not reach its new long term value immedi-
ately, hence labour remains relatively unproductive in the short run, implying
a lower demand than in the long run. This would make employment fall by
more (or increase by less) in the short run than in the long run. On the other
4I assume a wage markup µ = 1.1. I assume a capital elasticity α = 0.4, so that the
labour share, including featherbedding, is µ(1−α) = 0.66. I set the Frisch elasticity φ = 2
– but it is not crucial. The income effect is crucial, and I look at different values for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, between 0.5 and 2.
7
hand, capital accumulation also increases labour demand. Hence a positive
(or moderately negative) short run employment effect requires a strong re-
sponse of investment. This makes well-functioning capital markets all the
more essential.
3 Conclusion
In this paper I have built a model of featherbedding in the labour market,
and I have argued that it can be a good description of some sectors or in-
dustries where labour unions are relatively strong. I have shown that with
featherbedding, the wage is a markup over workers’ marginal rate of substi-
tution (MRS), but the wage is also a markup over firms’ marginal product
of labour. If these two markups are equal, the MPL and MRS are equalised.
However, since the wage is above the MPL, firms’ profits are abnormally low
– featherbedding rigidities act as a tax on capital and not on labour. When
capital is introduced, capital is inefficiently low, with ambiguous effects on
employment. If structural reforms only allow firms to choose employment
more freely without reducing the monopoly markup of unions, welfare im-
proves, but the long term effects on employment are small or negative. In
the short run, these reforms will be detrimental if sluggish investment does
not raise labour demand quickly enough.
Using this framework in larger DSGE models is an obvious possibility of
future research, to allow a more quantitative assessment, and to look at the
potential role of monetary policy or gradual firm entry. While featherbedding
is likely more prevalent in the labour market, some similar can exist in the
market for goods and services. In sectors with very little competition, it is
not uncommon that consumers have little choice about the amount of goods
or services that they can buy, and are forced to buy more than what they
would wish. The framework of this paper could hence also be used in the
goods market.
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Appendix: Proof of theorem 2
(1) write (K,L,C) as a function of the markup µ
MPL(K,L)− µMRS(C,L) = 0
MPK(K,L)− (ρ+ δ) = 0
F (K,L)− δK − C = 0
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Differentiating this system with a Jacobian,


KFKL
FL
LFLL
FL
− Lv
′′(L)
v′(L)
u′′(C)
u′(C)
C
KFKK LFKL 0
KFK −Kδ LFL −C




∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ

 =
1
0
0
As MPL and MPK are homogeneous of degree 0 in (K,L), one can show
that
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
=
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
=
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ
=
−1
σ + φ
with σ and φ the (possibly local) elasticities of consumption and work.
(2) write (K,L,C) as a function of the markup µ
MPL(K,L)−MRS(C,L) = 0
F (K,L)− µLMPL(K,L)− (ρ+ δ)K = 0
F (K,L)− δK − C = 0
A similar differentiation brings


KFKL
FL
LFLL
FL
− Lv
′′(L)
v′(L)
u′′(C)
u′(C)
C
(µ− 1)− µKFKL
FL
(1− µ)− µLFLL
FL
0
KFK −Kδ LFL −C




∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ

 =
0
µ
0
Using the (possibly local) elasticities (α, σ, φ), I get
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
=
(
α+φ+σ
LFL
C
α−
(µ−1)
µ
)
−1
φ+σ
< −1
φ+σ
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ
=
[
α+φ
(KFK−Kδ)
C
]
α−
(µ−1)
µ
−1
φ+σ
< −1
φ+σ
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
=
(
α−σ
(µ−1)δ(1−α)+ρα
µδ(1−α)+ρ
α−
(µ−1)
µ
)
−1
φ+σ
≷ 0
(3) Comparing the cases (1) and (2) above, one simply needs to look at
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
|(2) <
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
|(1)
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ
|(2) <
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ
|(1)
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
|(2) ≷
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
|(1)
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